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The EU, Democracy and Institutional
Structure: Past, Present and Future
Paul CRAIG**

1. Introduction
It is commonp[ace to bemoan the EU's democratic deficiencies, as attested to by the wea[th
of [iterature discussing the issue from a variety of perspectives. This chapter is not a [iterature
review. To the contrary, it advances my own view on the issue, a[beit one that is informed by
existing scho[arship. The ensuing ana[ysis is predicated on the assumption that a principal, a[beit
not exclusive, cause for concern about EU democracy isthe mismatch, or absence of fit, between
voter power and political responsibility.
EU decision-making isstructured such that voters cannot determine the shape or direction of EU
policy in the manner that occurs to a greater extent within Member States. It is not, therefore,
possible in the EU for the electorate to remove the incumbents from office, and replace them
with a different political party that has a different set of policies. It isthis malaise that underlies
Wei[er's critique of EU decision-making, captured in aphorismic terms by his affirmation of the
centrality to democracy of the voters' ability to 'throw the scoundrels out1]. It isthe same malaise
that informs Maduro's critique, to the effect that the 'real EU democratic deficit isthe absence of
European politics], manifest in the lack of democratic political contestation about the content
and direction of EU policy. Properly understood these are but two sides of the same coin.
The ensuing discussion takes the same starting point as Wei[er and Maduro. The direction of
travel thereafter is,however, rather different, insofar as we are concerned with explanation and
understanding of the status quo. The assumption, explicit or implicit, in much of the literature
is that the fault for this malaise resides with the EU. The pattern of thought seems strikingly
simple, shaped by the very cadence of language. This is most marked in the duality of meaning
accorded to the phrase the 'EU's democratic deficit', which is used descriptively to capture the
malaise adumbrated above, and deployed normatively to connote the fact that the fault resides
with the EU, which is regarded as architect and author of present reality.
* Paul Craig, The EU, Democracy and Institutional Structure: Past, Present and Future (May 13, 2018). A Bakardijieva
Engelbrekt and X Groussot (eds) The Future of Europe, 2018; Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 3/2019. Available
at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3177736 and republished with the author's agreement.
Professor of English Law, St John's College, Oxford.
JHH Weiler, U Haltern and F Mayer, 'European Democracy and its Critique', in J Hayward (ed), The Crisis of
Representation in Europe (Frank Cass, 1995); JHH Weiler, 'Europe in Crisis - on "Political Messianism", "Legitimacy" and
the "Rule of Law"' [2012] Singapore Jnl of Legal Studies 248.
[A M Maduro, 'A New Governance for the European Union and the Euro: Democracy and Justice', RSCAS Policy Paper
2012/11,1.
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The academic line of argument pursued thereafter flows naturally from the preceding duality of
meaning. Given that the democratic shortcoming resides descriptively and normatively with the
EU, democracy must therefore remain in the Member States, which are said to be the principal
sites for democratic legitimation. Some of the literature on 'demoicracy' is grounded, in part
at least, on such assumptions. The discussion that follows takes issue with this descriptive and
normative linkage, and hence with the conclusions drawn therefrom.
It wi[[ be argued that the preceding linkage does not withstand examination. Insofar as there
is a democratic deficit of the kind identified above, it flows from choices made expressly and
repeatedly by the Member States over time as to the institutional structure for decision-making
which they are willing to accept. These choices could have been different. There is no a priori
block in this respect. There is,to the contrary, no especial difficulty in devising an EU decisionmaking regime that would meet the democratic shortcomings outlined above. The EU itself is
not blameless with respect to the mode of decision-making, and nothing in the present chapter is
predicated on that assumption. Improvements could doubtless be made in the manner in which
the principal EU institutions operate. This does not alter the fact that that the Treaty architecture
that frames their respective powers, and the way in which they inter-relate, is the result of
Member State choice, made and re-made since the inception of the Community.
It wi[[ also be argued that there are, however, four constraints to a fit between the EU's
institutional decision-making structure, and the precepts of democracy. The constraints are
political, democratic, constitutional and substantive. The political constraint is predicated on
the assumption that some form of parliamentary majoritarian regime would meet the democratic
deficit articulated above, thereby ensuring a closer nexus between voter preferences and political
responsibility. Change of the kind that would meet the democratic infirmity thus conceived is,
however, very unlikely to occur, because the Member States wi[[ not accept it for the reasons
explicated below. The democratic constraint is expressive of the fact that there is contestation as
to whether such a parliamentary-type regime really is the most appropriate model for a polity
such as the EU, or whether a different form of democratic ordering would be better suited.
The constitutional constraint denotes the fact that EU decision-making is limited by the very
nature of the constituent Treaties. National constitutions constrain political choice. It is inherent
in their very nature. The EU is no different in this respect in principle, in the sense that the
founding Treaties form the architecture to which legislation made thereunder must conform.
The difference is one of degree, but it is significant nonetheless, since the EU Treaties are far
more detailed than any national constitution, and hence the room for democratic policy choice
is more circumscribed. The substantive constraint speaks to the democratic consequences of
the imbalance between the economic and the social within the EU, as manifest in the original
Treaties, and as a consequence of the EU's financial crisis.

2. Institutional Structure and Democracy: The Past
The Community may only be 60 years old, but it is nonetheless easy to forget its institutional
origins, and the conception of democracy that existed, or not as the case maybe, at the outset.
The reality was that the original disposition of power in the Rome Treaty saw little role for
direct democratic input. The Assembly was accorded limited power, and its only role in the
legislative process was a right to be consulted where a particular Treaty article so specified.
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The principal institutional players were the Council and Commission, but in many respects the
Rome Treaty placed the Commission in the driving seat inthe development of Community policy.
The Commission had the right of legislative initiative; it could alter a measure before the Council
acted; its measurers could only be amended by unanimity in the Counci[; it devised the overall
legislative agenda; and it had a plethora of other executive, administrative and judicial functions.
The message was that, while the Council had to consent to proposed legislation, it was not
easy for it to alter the Commission's proposal. The Commission might therefore have become
something akin to a 'government' for the emerging Community[4 ].
This vision accorded with, and was influenced by, Monnet's vision of Europe and by
neofunctiona[ism. Monnet's conception of Europe was strongly influenced by the role of
technocrats trained in the French Grands Ecoles. It served to explain the structure of the ECSC,
and the centrality of the High Authority therein, which embodied Monnet's technocratic
approach. A corporatist style involving networks of interest groups was the other legacy
of Monnet's experience with planning authority's in FranceN. It was institutiona[ised in the
ECSC in the form of the Consultative Committee. Integration was based on the combination
of benevolent technocrats and economic interest groups, which would build transnationa[
coalitions for European po[icy.['] Monnet's strategy was thus for what has been termed elite-led
gradua[ism. The Assemb[y's powers within the ECSC were very limited.
The same genera[ institutional structure was to be carried over to the EEC: 'enlightened
administration on behalf of uninformed publics, in cooperation with affected interests and
subject to the approval of national governments, was therefore the compromise again struck in
the Treaties of Rome'N. While Monnet favoured a democratic Community 'he saw the emergence
of loyalties to the Community institutions developing as a consequence of elite agreements for
the functional organization of Europe, not as an essentia[ prerequisite to that organization.'M
Neofunctiona[ism was to be the vehicle through which Community integration, conceived of
as technocratic, elite-led gradualism, combined with corporatist style engagement of affected
interests, was to be rea[ised. Neofunctiona[ism fitted neatly with Monnet's perception of the
Community. Monnet and neofunctiona[ists also shared the same sense of legitimacy and
democracy. For Monnet, and like-minded followers, the legitimacy of the Community was
to be secured through outcomes, peace and prosperity. The ECSC was established in part to
prevent a third European war. The EEC was created in large part for the direct economic benefits
of a common market. Peace and prosperity were potent benefits for the people in the 1950s.
Democracy was, by way of contrast, a secondary consideration, since it was felt that the best
way to secure peace and prosperity was by technocratic elite-led guidance.
3JArt 250(1) EC.
4] K Neunreither, 'Transformation of a Political Role: Reconsidering the Case of the Commission of the European

Communities' (1971-2) 10JCMS 233.
" K Featherstone, 'Jean Monnet and the 'Democratic Deficit' in the European Union' (1994) 32JCMS 149,154-155.
6 H Wallace, 'European Governance in Turbulent Times' (1993) 31 JCMS 293, 300.
1

[7 W Wallace and J Smith, 'Democracy or Technocracy? European Integration and the Problem of Popular Consent' in

J Hayward

(ed), The Crisis of Representation in Europe (Frank Cass, 1995) 140.

[I Ibid 143.
[I M Holland, European Community Integration (St. Martin's Press, 1993) 16. Italics in the original.
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3. Institutional Structure and Democracy: The Present
Prognostication as to the future is perilous at the best of times, more especial[y so in relation to
an institution such as the EU. Exogenous shocks external to the EU, which are unforeseen and
unforeseeable, can shatter the very best reasoned predictions. Endogenous change from within
the EU can, in similar vein, disrupt future visions that would otherwise be p[ausib[y grounded, as
attested to by the Catalonia problem in Spain, and electoral change in the Czech Republic, Austria
and Ita[y. While prediction is,therefore, fraught with difficulty, a necessary condition for any such
exercise is to be cognizant of the rationale for the status quo. To forget the lessons of history is
to invite repetition of past mistakes, or it is to predicate views as to future institutional change
on assumptions that are unsustainab[e when viewed in historical perspective. The significance of
this will be apparent in the ensuing discussion, which is premised on the institutional disposition
of power that current[y prevails.
Space precludes detailed ana[ysis of the passage from the initial institutional division of power
in the Rome Treaty, to the schema embodied in the Lisbon Treaty[1"]. Readers will be familiar with
this, and reference will be made to it in the subsequent ana[ysis. Suffice it to say for the present
that the EP increased its power within the decision-making process. This occurred initial[y through
the co-operation procedure, introduced by the Single European Act 1986, and then through
the co-decision procedure in the Maastricht Treaty, as further strengthened by the Amsterdam
Treaty. The EP attained something approximating to co-equal status in the legislative process
with the Council, as later recognized by the Lisbon Treaty.[11' The European Council, as the ultimate
repository of Member State power, also came to exercise an ever-increasing role in the decisionmaking process, de facto and dejure, which was affirmed and strengthened in the Lisbon Treaty.[12]
The legal and political rea[ity, as reflected in the Lisbon Treaty, was an institutional decisionmaking process in which state interests still predominated, and in which, notwithstanding the
increase in the EP's power, the voters could not direct[y affect a change of po[icy direction in
the EU by removing the incumbents and replacing them with those espousing different policies.
The Brexit discourse was conducted explicit[y against the status quo, and implicit[y against
assumptions concerning ascription of responsibi[ity for the existing schema. Thus the ills of the
EU, whatsoever they might current[y be, were conceived to be the responsibi[ity of the EU,
viewed in this respect primari[y, but not so[ely, as the Commission, together with other 'powers'
in Brussels. This is a great story, save for the fact that it bears little relation to rea[ity. What is
missing is considered discourse concerning the constitutional responsibi[ity of the Member States
for the status quo.
This is readi[y apparent in relation to the inter-institutional division of power within the EU.
It is common[y acknowledged that the democratic deficit is a prominent feature of the EU's
[egitimacy problem, with the attendant implication, as noted in the introduction, that it is not
just a problem that besets the EU, but is the EU's fault. It is the EU qua real and reified entity that
suffers from this infirmity, the coro[[ary being that blame is cast on it. The EU is not blameless
I10]
P Craig, 'Institutions, Power and Institutional Balance', in PCraig and Gde Burca (eds) The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford
University Press, 2nd edn, 2011) Ch 3. 7
Arts 14(1), 16(1) TEU.
[ Art 15 TEU.
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in this respect, but nor are the Member States, viewed collectively and individually. This is not
to deny the existence of problems in this regard, the disjunction between political power and
electoral accountability being an important facet of the democracy deficit argument["].
It is to ask who bears responsibility for the status quo. This is all
the more surprising given the
sophisticated literature from international relations and political science concerning the relative
influences of different players during periods of Treaty change, as we[[ as in relation to the passage
of EU legislation. The facts are not readily contestable, at [east in relation to Treaty amendment.
The stark reality isthat the present disposition of EU institutional power isthe result of successive
Treaties in which the principal players have been the Member States. There may we[[ be debate as
to the relative degree of power wielded by Member States and the EU institutions in the shaping
of EU legislation, but there is greater consensus on the fact that Member States have dominated
at times of Treaty reform[14].
Thus, insofar as the present arrangements divide EU po[icymaking de facto and de jure between
the Commission, Council, European Parliament and European Council, this is reflective of power
balances that the Member States were willing to accept. This is readily apparent when considering
the initial Rome Treaty and any of the five major Treaty reforms since then. It is powerfully
exemplified by the debates concerning institutional reforms in the Constitutional Treaty, which
were taken over into the Lisbon Treaty["5 ]. It was evident most notably in the battle as to whether
the EU should have a single President who would be located in the Commission, or whether a
reinforced European Council should also have a long-term President[1 6]. It was apparent in the
debates as to Council configurations, and who would chair them. It was the frame within which the
discourse took place concerning the number of Commissioners and the method of choosing them.
If blame is to be cast for the institutional status quo, and for its democratic shortcomings,
then it should principally be [aid at the door of the creators of the scheme, the Member States,
who must bear, individually and collectively, constitutional responsibility for the status quo.
The EU institutional disposition of power was the Member States' choice, which was made and
reaffirmed over half a century. It was not foisted on them, and it was not a fait accomp[i in
relation to which they had no input. To the contrary, the Member States were, and remain, the
institutional architects of the status quo.

I'l

Weiler, Haltern and Mayer (n 1);
A Follesdal and S Hix, 'Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response
to Majone and Moravcsik' (2006) 44 JCMS 533; K Nicolafdis, 'The Idea of European Demoicracy', in J Dickson and
P Eleftheriadis (eds), Philosophical Foundations ofEULaw (Oxford University Press, 2012); K Nicoladis, 'Our European
Demoi-cracy: Is this Constitution a Third Way for Europe?', in K Nicolafdis and S Weatherill (eds), Whose Europe?
National Models and the Constitution o/the European Union (Oxford University Press, 2003).
I14G Marks, L Hooghe and K Blank, 'European Integration from the 1980s: State-Centric v.Multiple-Level Governance'
(1996) 34 JCMS 341, 342; T Risse-Kappen, 'Exploring the Nature of the Beast: International Relations Theory and
Comparative policy Analysis Meet the European Union' (1996) 34 JCMS 53A Moravcsik, 'Preferences and Power in the
European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach' (1993) 31 JCMS 473; A Moravcsik, NationalPreference
Formation and interstate Bargaining in the European Community, 1955-86 (Harvard University Press, 1992); A Moravcsik,
'Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community'
(1991) 45 International Organization 19; M Pollack, 'International Relations Theory and European Integration' EUI
Working Papers, RSC 2000/55.
lip Norman, TheAccidental Constitution, The Making ofEurope'sConstitutional Treaty (EuroComment, 2nd ed, 2005).
p Craig, The Lisbon Treaty, Law, Politics and Treaty Reform (Oxford University Press, 2010) Ch 3.
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4. Institutional Structure and Democracy:
The Future - Four Constraints
The preceding backdrop is a necessary condition for making plausible suggestions concerning the
future disposition of inter-institutional power in the EU. It might be argued that reforms could
alleviate the existing democratic disjunction between electoral power and political responsibility,
and that the change whereby the Commission President was indirectly elected by reason of
being the candidate of the party that secured most seats inthe European Parliament is a natural
pointer in this direction. This could provide the foundation for true democratic contestation,
whereby voters would be offered alternative political agendas for the EU, and their votes would
truly determine the policy path for the next five years.
This could in theory happen. There are a range of democratic solutions available. It does not
require some new master-plan of arrangements hitherto unknown to the world of democratic
political architecture. A pretty-detailed schema, premised on some form of parliamentary
democratic regime, could be sketched out. Thus, to take one possible way forward, it would
be possible to have a regime in which the people voted directly for two constituent parts of
the legislature, the European Parliament and Council, and for the President of the Commission
and the President of the European Council. It would be possible in theory to have the previous
package, but only a single elected President for the EU as whole. It would be possible for the
entire Commission to be reflective of the majority party in the EP, and not just the President of
the Commission. It would be possible for the EP to have a right of legislative initiative in tandem
with that of the Commission. It is possible to devise such a schema with conditions devised to
protect against undesirable consequences of majoritarianism. The linkage between electoral
power, substantive policy choice and accountability would be more visible and it would be
strengthened. There are necessary qualifications to this type of mode[, which wi[[ be addressed in
the section on democratic constraints below, but it provides a useful starting point for discussion.
(a) PoliticalConstraints
(i) Member States
The principal reason why nothing akin to the preceding mode[ is likely to occur is that Member
States are the main architects of Treaty change and they have never been willing to accept
such a disposition of power. We must, as noted above, remember the past when planning the
future. It is true that the choice between two Presidents and a single President for the EU was
debated during the negotiations leading to the Constitutional Treaty. It is equally true that
discourse concerning the election of the Commission President began in the 1980s. The broader
reforms adumbrated above were not, however, on the political agenda during the extensive
negotiations concerning institutional power in 2003-4 that led to the Constitutiona[Treaty, nor
in the subsequent discussions that culminated in the Lisbon Treaty.
The reason why nothing akin to the preceding mode[ has ever appeared in formal discussion of
Treaty reform is not hard to divine. The Member States would lose power in relative and absolute
terms. They would no longer be masters of the treaty. The preceding mode[, or something
akin thereto, would alleviate the democratic deficit as conceived in the preceding sense, but
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in doing so it would endow the elected majority in the EP, and the duly elected Presidents
of the Commission and European Council, with a mandate and an authority to discharge the
promised electoral pledges. This would be a fortiori so if the members of the Council were also
directly elected. Such a regime would inevitably significantly circumscribe Member State room
for manoeuvre. It would create a substantive path dependency as to the direction of policy, and
the priorities to be fulfilled.
It is,therefore, unsurprising that nothing akin to this has featured in serious political deliberations
concerning the direction of institutional change within the EU. Viewed from this perspective,
the democratic concession in the 2015 EP elections, known as the Spitzenkandidaten process,
whereby the Commission President was imbued with greater legitimacy, because he was
supported by the dominant political party, and canvassed as its candidate, could be accepted
by the Member States because it did not fundamentally change the status quo ante. It did not
create a path dependency towards a political agenda that committed the EU to a particular
substantive set of reforms. It did not substantially undermine Member State power to set the
pace and content of the EU agenda from within the European Council, and the Council. Moreover,
the very fact that the other members of the Commission continued to be chosen by the Member
States perforce limited the extent to which the Commission President, of whatever political
persuasion, could shape the political agenda.
The preceding point is reinforced by the fact that the Member States have refused to confirm
the continued application of the Spitzenkandidaten process in the 2019 elections[17]. The formal
legal reality is that the European Council is only obliged to take account of the result in the
European elections, when it proposes its candidate for Commission President to the European
Parliament[18]. The European Parliament then votes on the candidate. The Commission and the
EP, not surprisingly, pressed for the continuation of the Spitzenkandidaten process, arguing
that it would increase public interest in EU affairs, and thereby augment the democratic
legitimacy of the outcome. The Member States were, however, resistant to continuation of the
schema, in part because the evidence indicated that only 5 per cent of voters went to the polls
to influence the choice of Commission President, with little if anything to show in terms of
increased voter turnout. They were also resistant to continuation of the 2015 regime on the
ground that while it would strengthen the linkage between the Commission and the EP, this could
damage the democratic legitimacy of the Commission President. The argument was that the
Spitzenkandidaten system robbed the Commission president of the 'dual legitimacy' that would
otherwise flow from approval by the democratically-elected national leaders in the European
Council, followed by that of the EP. While the European Council cannot, in formal terms, prevent
the EP from operating the Spitzenkandidaten process, they can refuse to accept the candidate
of the winning party as automatic incumbent of the office of Commission President. This would,
moreover, accord the Member States further leverage ex ante, in the sense that they could
influence who is nominated as a candidate by the EP political parties.
The assertion of national control over the EU's inter-institutional architecture is further evident in
Member State rejection of suggestions from Jean-Claude Juncker that the Commission President
could be double-hatted, functioning also as Chair of European Council meetings. The Member
17jhttp://cer.eu/publications/archive/bulletin-article/2018/member-states-and-eu-taking-back-control
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States showed no appetite for this suggestion in the deliberations leading to the Constitutional
Treaty, and their position in this respect has not altered in the interim. Member State control is
evident yet again in the reluctance to move towards a smaller Commission, which would mean
that not every state would have a Commissioner all the time. While Commissioners do not
formally represent their country, the Member States are, nonetheless, reluctant to give up their
own national inthe Commission decision-making process. It is paradoxical that these outcomes
are occurring when the UK is set to leave the EU, since the UK would applaud the reaffirmation
of Member State voice in EU decision-making.
Member State opposition to reforms of the kind being considered here would, moreover, not be
confined to the executive branch of government. The same sentiment would be voiced by some
national Parliaments, which would not view with equanimity such institutional architecture,
since it would be regarded as increasing the EU's legitimacy at the expense, inter alia, of national
parliaments. Thus, while it suits the agenda of some political groupings in national parliaments
to critique the EU's democratic credentials, they would, nonetheless, be resistant to change that
alleviated such concerns, if it thereby enhanced the EU's democratic legitimacy by providing
the linkage between electoral power and political responsibility, with the consequence that the
authority of national parliaments was thereby diminished.
The diminution of state power that would be entailed by change of the kind mooted above
would, moreover, be constitutionally challenged in some countries, on the ground that the EU
was truly becoming a super-state. Thus, while the German Federal Constitutional Court has
repeatedly chided the EU in relation to its democratic credentials, it would likely be one of the
national constitutional courts to decide that an institutional configuration of the kind set out
above, which addressed the democratic deficit as present[y understood, would not be compatible
with German constitutional law. This was because such a change would mean that the EU was
moving closer to a federal state, with the consequence that the Member States could no longer
be regarded as the Masters of the Treaty in the manner hitherto.
The political constraints on alleviating the democratic deficit have been exacerbated by the rise
in populism in some Member States. This is not the place to engage in discourse concerning the
meaning, and causes of, populism[19]. That would require a paper or book in itself, and it would
not be possible to do justice to the complexities of the argument inthe context of this chapter.
Suffice it to say the following for the present. Whatsoever one's views concerning the meaning
and causes of populism, the effect thereof has been to render states more suspicious of 'external'
authority, and less inclined to accept choices that are not in accord with their own preferences.
It is debatable whether this is an a priori consequence of populism, although it probably is. It is,
however, certainly a contingent consequence, so far as concerns the effect of populism in EU
Member States. Given that this is so, such Member States are less likely to accept changes to
the institutional architecture of EU decision-making which would diminish their power over the
direction of EU policy.

I'll

See, e.g.,

J Judis,

The Populist Explosion: How the Great Recession Transformed American and European Politics

(Columbia Global Reports, 2016); B Moffitt, The GlobalRise o/Populism:Performance, PoliticalStyle, and Representation
(Stanford University Press, 2016); J-W Muller, What/s Populism? (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016); G de Burca, 'Is
EU Supranational Governance a Challenge to Liberal Constitutionalism?', SSRN 3105238.
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(ii) The EU
The EP wou[d natura[[y favour change that wou[d a[[eviate the democratic deficit. The increased
conjunction between e[ectora[ power and po[itica[ responsibi[ity wou[d enhance its power, more
especia[[y so if it resu[ted in the entire Commission bearing the po[itica[ stamp of the dominant
party in the EP. The setting of a tru[y EU e[ectora[ agenda, trans[ated into po[itica[ action by a
Commission charged with the task of fu[fi[[ing the e[ectora[ mandate, wou[d transform the EP's
ro[e as compared to the status quo. This wou[d be further enhanced if there were EU po[itica[
parties, and if the EP were to gain a right of [egis[ative initiative in addition to that of the
Commission.
The Commission's perspective wou[d [ike[y be more equivoca[, since such change wou[d entai[
gains and [osses when viewed from its institutiona[ perspective. There wou[d be gains, insofar as
the EU wou[d have greater [egitimacy, which wou[d reinforce its authority over existing categories
of competence, and faci[itate transfer of further power. The [egitimacy of the Commission within
such a schema wou[d be augmented, by reason of its e[ectora[ credentia[s. There wou[d, at
the same time, be [osses for the Commission, since change of the kind under consideration
wou[d reduce its room for setting the po[icy agenda, and wou[d constrain, in re[ative terms, the
technocratic autonomy that it present[y enjoys.
The European Counci[ wou[d [ike[y fa[[ at the other end of the spectrum. Its President is current[y
ensured presumptive support from the heads of the Member State, by reason of the fact that
they choose the incumbent after [engthy de[iberation. There cou[d be no such guarantee if the
President of the European Counci[ were to be direct[y e[ected. The re[ative importance of the
President wou[d, moreover, be [ike[y to diminish if the current method of appointment were
retained, but the Commission President were to be direct[y e[ected on a party po[itica[ p[atform,
more especia[[y if other Commissioners were simi[ar[y e[ected. The President of the European
Counci[ wou[d henceforth be on the back-foot, as compared to a Commission President invested
with the authority to carry out the e[ectora[ programme. Furthermore, the heads of state within
the European Counci[ wou[d be un[ike[y to view with equanimity an institutiona[ regime in which
the mode of inter-governmenta[ adjustment were undu[y constrained.
(b) Democratic Constraints
When articulating the preceding mode[ for change that wou[d a[[eviate the democratic deficit
it was noted that the mode[ would have to be qualified. It is now time to make good on that
qualification.
The EU has always been grounded in two patterns of representation, the people being
represented in the European Parliament, state interests in the Council and European Council.
Reforms to alleviate the democratic deficit by increasing the connection between electoral power
and political responsibility focus primarily on the first mode of representation, the connection
between voter choice, the EP and the shaping of the EU policy agenda.
The reality is, however, that even if the broader package of reforms were adopted it could not
ensure that the people would exercise electoral control over the direction of EU policy, since the
European Council would still be populated by Heads of State, who would continue to have a
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marked influence over the po[icy agenda. The second mode of representation, via state interests,
wou[d perforce constrain the first, and this wou[d be so even if the President of the European
Counci[ were to be e[ected. This is especia[[y so, given the centra[ity of the European Counci[
to agenda setting and the choice of priorities, such that nothing significant happens in the EU
without its imprimatur.
It might be argued that there is nothing unusua[ inthis respect, since it is a standard feature of
nationa[ federa[ systems that there is dua[ity of representation, the norma[ pattern being that
state interests and those of the peop[e are dea[t with in different parts of the [egis[ature. The
dua[ity does not prevent the offering of a coherent package to the e[ectors. The two modes of
representation do not, therefore, hinder the foundationa[ democratic precept, viz that the voters
choose who shou[d represent them and the direction of po[icy, with the consequence that if
parties fai[ to satisfy voter choice they pay the price at the ba[[ot box.
The nationa[ ana[ogy is instructive, precise[y because it does not rep[icate at EU [eve[. There
is simi[arity insofar as both the EU and the federa[ systems are premised on two modes of
representation, the peop[e, and the states. The simi[arity is, however, superficial, and
concea[s deeper differences. The rea[ity is that there is a hierarchy between the two modes of
representation, which do not natura[[y co-exist on an equa[ footing. Infedera[ states, the paradigm
isthat representation of the peop[e has primacy, or there is parity between such representation
and that of the states. This does not ho[d true for the EU, where state representation through the
Counci[ and European Counci[ is more powerfu[ than that of the peop[e in the EP.
Thus in federa[ par[iamentary regimes there are two component parts of the [egis[ature, with
the po[itica[ agenda common[y set by the house e[ected by the peop[e, with state interests, as
represented in the other house, ab[e to exert influence on the [egis[ation. In federa[ Presidentia[
systems, such as the USA, the ba[ance of power between the e[ected houses may be different.
It does not, however, a[ter the point made here, because voters have voice in re[ation to both
houses, given that the incumbents are directly e[ected on party po[itica[ tickets, repub[ican or
democrat; and given a[so that substantive po[icy wi[[ be set to some degree by the President, who
is directly e[ected. A connection between voter choice and po[icy direction is thereby preserved.
The converse pertains as to the hierarchy between the two modes of representation in the EU.
It is representation of state interests that is accorded primacy, de jure and de facto, through
the Counci[ and the European Council, with representation of the peop[e through the EP being
secondary in this respect when viewed from an historica[ perspective. This is readi[y apparent
in the Treaty provisions concerning the institutions["], which are reinforced by their practica[
modus operandi.
The reasons for the difference between the nation state and the EU in this respect are not hard
to divine. Representation of state interests within a federa[ po[ity and within the EU are markedly
different. Commona[ity of interest, shared identity and so[idarity is considerab[y greater in the
former, than in the [atter, and that is so notwithstanding that there may be po[icy differences
between regions within a federa[ state. Prob[ems of domination of one state over another are,
by way of contrast, considerab[y greater in the [atter context than in the former, which serves
IZll
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to explain the attention given to voting rules and other mechanisms designed to alleviate this
problem in the EU.
It is important, therefore, to view proposals to alleviate the EU's democratic deficit against the
preceding backdrop. The reality isthat such proposals entail a reordering of the hierarchy in the
modes of representation as they pertain in the EU. Representation of the people is afforded
elevated status, as manifest in the desire that voter choice be translated into political action, such
that the gulf between electoral power and political responsibility is eradicated or significantly
diminished. This necessarily involves reduction in the power wielded by the institutions that
represent state interests.
It might be argued by way of response that this reba[ancing is precisely what is intended, to
which the counter isthat the states are unlikely to accept the substantive path dependency and
loss of power that would be attendant on this change. It might, alternatively, be argued that
alleviation of the democratic deficit can be accomplished without the reba[ancing adumbrated
above, to which the answer isthat such an argument must be fleshed out to test its institutional
and substantive veracity.
Concerns of an analogous nature have been expressed by Scharpf[21], who argues that
an unqualified majoritarian system would be problematic in the EU. He points out that
constitutional democracies, such as Switzerland, Belgium or Canada, in which there is societal
division, combined with structural majorities and minorities, often resort to 'consociationa[' or
'consensus democracy' with bicameral legislatures, supermajoritarian decision rules and the
like to protect the interests and of minority groups. While it is contestable whether the EU is
characterized by the persistent, reinforcing cleavages that prevail in such countries, there is little
doubt that some qualifications to majoritarianism would be required[22].
Present decision rules could of course be modified in some ways, perhaps to relax the
Commission's monopoly of legislative initiatives. But they could not be replaced by a regime of
straightforward majority rule without provoking disruptive political conflicts and radical antiEuropean opposition in Member States whose national politico-economic and socioeconomic
orders and values could be overridden by explicitly political decisions adopted by majorities
of 'foreigners' in the European Parliament (EP) and in the Council. In other words, the explicit
switch to majority rule would destroy the protection of persistent minorities that is presently
ensured by the Community Method. And it could po[iticise European legislation in ways that
might transform the largely dormant 'no-demos issue' of EU legitimacy into conflicts that could
destroy the Union.
(c) ConstitutionalConstraints
(i) Constitutionalization: Vertical and Horizontal Dimensions
The discussion thus far has been concerned with po[itica[ constraints to change that wou[d
a[[eviate the democratic deficit, these coming [arge[y from Member State opposition for the
reasons adumbrated above. There is, however, a further constraint as concerns reforms that
[ F Scharpf, 'After the Crash: A Perspective on Multilevel European Democracy' (2015) 21 EL] 384, 395.
lIbid 395.
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would alleviate the democratic deficit, which would exist even if the Member States changed
their view and were willing to embrace reform. The constraint flows from the constitutiona[ization
that attaches to a[[ Treaty provisions. There is a duality to this constraint, which operates both
vertically and horizontally.
The vertical dimension captures the effect of such constitutiona[ization on relations between
the Member States and the EU. It speaks to the limits placed on Member State action when
subject matter fa[ls within the sphere of EU law. Foundational EU constitutional doctrines such
as supremacy, direct effect and pre-emption kick in to constrict Member State action. This isso
in relation to the great majority of Treaty articles, and much of the legislation enacted pursuant
to the Treaty. Disquiet as to the limits thereby placed on Member State action is exacerbated
by what is perceived to be the imbalance between the economic and the social within the EU,
with the consequence that constitutiona[ized EU law can place severe limits on this balance at
Member State [eve[.
The horizontal dimension of constitutiona[ization addresses the confines thereby placed
on political choice at EU [eve[. This dimension is especially important in relation to changes
designed to alleviate the democratic deficit by increasing the connection between electoral
power and political responsibility. A[[ constitutions restrict choices that can be made via every day
politics. It is integral to the very nature of constitutions that they entail some pre-commitment,
which confines choices that can be made thereafter, subject to any constitutional amendment.
The limits may be procedural, or substantive. The difference with respect to the EU isone of degree,
not of kind, but it is significant nonetheless, since the constitutiona[ized EU Treaty is far more
detailed than any national constitution. It still [eaves room for some policy choice as concerns
the direction of EU policy. The EU Treaty, nonetheless, limits the range of such choice that rival
political parties can place before the electorate. There is much in the Treaty that constitutes
substantive path dependency for the direction of EU policy, thereby limiting po[iticization.
Concerns as to the preceding vertical and horizontal constraints have been voiced by scholars such
as Grimm, who has focused on what he terms the democratic costs of constitutiona[ization[23].
His central thesis isthat the EU Treaties are over-constitutiona[ized, with the consequence that
they are thereby taken off the agenda of normal politics, notwithstanding the fact that many such
issues that would be regarded as within the province of ordinary law in Member States: 'in the
EU the crucial difference between the rules for political decisions and the decisions themselves
is to a large extent levelled[2 4 ]. It is inherent in the nature of constitutions that they function
as the framework for political decisions, with the consequence that elections 'do not matter
as far as constitutional law extends'[ 2 ].There may be too little constitutiona[ism, but there
may also be too much, with the consequence that the democratic process is fettered[2 ]. While
there are no universally applicable principles for determining the content of a Constitution, the
'function of constitutions is to [egitimise and to limit political power, not to replace it'[27 ], with
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the consequence that constitutions are a 'framework for politics, not the blueprint for all political
decisions'[28 ].
The EU Treaties fulfil many of the functions of national constitutions, specifying matters such
as the inter-institutional distribution of power, the mode of law-making, and the respective
competence of the EU and Member States. They also go significantly beyond the remit of national
constitutions, with the consequence that a wide range of matters becomes constitutiona[ized and
taken off the agenda of normal politics. The effect of this is further enhanced by the constitutional
doctrines of direct effect and supremacy, which transformed the four economic freedoms from
'objective principles for legislation into subjective rights of the market participants who could
claim them against the Member States before the national courts' [29].
This in turn meant that there were two modes of EU integration. The Treaty precepts could be
advanced through legislation enacted by the EU institutions, or they could be taken forward
through judicial decisions, which were imbued with considerable force through direct effect and
supremacy[30]. Member States had limited influence over the latter, and this was particularly
important since the lack of differentiation between the constitutional law [eve[ and the ordinary
law [eve[, meant that the 'constitutiona[ization of the treaties immunises the Commission and
particularly the ECJ against any attempt by the democratically responsible institutions of the EU
to react to the Court's jurisprudence by changing the law'[31]. For Grimm, the remedy was to limit
the EU Treaties to their truly constitutional elements and downgrade other Treaty provisions that
were not constitutional nature to the status of secondary law.
(ii) Competence: Vertical and Horizontal Dimensions
Constitutiona[ization is not the only constitutional constraint on political choice. It is also limited
by the competence accorded to the EU. Political choices placed before the electorate in nation
states are paradigmatica[[y predicated on the state having plenary power. The assumption is
that, subject to constitutional limits, the rival political parties can place before the electorate
a range of options, which cover economic, social and political issues, broadly defined. This is
the very lifeblood of normal politics, with contestation concerning matters such as economic
redistribution, social welfare, health, crime and education, featuring prominently on the electoral
agenda. There is a vertical and a horizontal dimension to such [imitations on competence as they
pertain to the EU.
The most obvious dimension of competence is on the vertical plane, insofar as it demarcates the
respective spheres of authority of the EU and the Member States. It follows that, even assuming
the Member States were willing to alleviate the democratic deficit by embracing political
reordering of the kind set out above, the choices that rival political parties could place before the
electorate are framed by the limits of EU competence. It is not, therefore, open to a political party
to promise far-reaching change in social welfare or economic redistribution, since the EU does
[81Ibid 465.
[ Ibid 467.
[30]JWeiler, 'The Community System: The Dual Character of Supranationalism' (1981) 1YBEL 267, and 'The Transformation
of Europe' (1991) 100 Yale _J2403, 2412-31; P Craig, 'Once Upon aTime in the West: Direct Effect and the Federalization
of EEC Law' (1992) 12 OiLS 453.
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not have competence over such matters, nor does it have the tax base from which to effectuate
such change, the EU still being principally a regulatory state in this regard. It is, moreover, not
open to a political party to promise far-reaching change on matters that are of prime concern to
voters in national elections, such as education, health, crime and the like, since the EU's powers
are limited in such areas.
There is,however, a less obvious dimension of competence that resonates horizontally, insofar
as it frames the exercise of political choice by the EU institutions when making EU policy.This is
the consequence of the fact that not a[[ heads of competence are created equal. The EU's power
over different areas varies significantly, being dependent in part on whether the competence
is exclusive, shared or complementary, and in part on the fact that even within each such
category it is only by looking closely at the relevant Treaty provisions that one can determine
the real scope of EU power. There is therefore no 'boi[erp[ate' that determines the nature of
power possessed by the EU in the diverse areas that fa[l within, for example, shared competence.
The horizontal dimension to competence is, moreover, manifest in the fact that the Treaties
specify to some significant degree the hierarchy of substantive provisions, as attested to most
notably by the dominance of the four freedoms. This perforce shapes the political choices that
the EU institutions are able to make.
There are, moreover, instances where there isa mismatch between the expectations of what the
EU is expected to do, and the limits of the competence accorded to it, as powerfully exemplified
by the rule of law crisis. This may, in the medium term, prove to be the most serious of the crises
faced by the EU. There isa rich and sophisticated literature on the topic, which explores the limits
of the powers currently available to the EU, and how they could be applied[2 ]. There is,moreover,
a duality to the concept of national constitutional responsibility as it pertains to the rule of law
crisis most especially in Poland and Hungary. There isthe fact that the principal responsibility for
the crisis resides with the states that introduced the illiberal measures threatening the rule of law.
There isthe secondary responsibility that lies with the Member States collectively, as reflected
in the Treaty provisions, which give expression to the limits of the controls over Member State
action that they are willing to accept. The terms of Article 7 TEU set the parameters for such
action, and are predicated on the assumption that there wi[[ not be more than one misbehaving
state at any point in time. The reality is that the EU is caught between a rock and a hard place,
or if you prefer more classical illusions, between Scylla and Charybdis: it risks being damned for
doing too little, criticized for being ineffectual; or criticized for trying to do too much, and thereby
straying into the terrain of domestic politics where it lacks competence.
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(d) Substantive Constraints
The fourth constraint on exercise of democratic political choice is substantive. It is related to the
constitutional constraint, but distinct nonetheless, and hence warrants separate consideration.
The balance between the economic and the social has been a contentious feature of the EEC
since its inception, and continues to be so. It is manifest in two ways.
(i) The Economic and the Social: Core Treaty Provisions
Scharpf has long argued that the EU embodies an asymmetry between the economic and the
social, such that the former is prioritized at the expense of the latter["]. He contends that the
EU is premised on asymmetrical treatment of the economic and social spheres. The economic
order has predominated, as evidenced by the Treaty provisions, and the primacy accorded to
completion of the single market, with the attendant priority placed on market and competitive
principles. Scharpf argued that it would have been possible, when the Rome Treaty was framed,
to have made harmonization of social protection a pre-condition for market integration, given
that the welfare regimes of the original six Member States were relatively rudimentary and closer
than they have since become.
If the Rome Treaty had been cast in this form, then the debates at EU [eve[ about the interplay
between social protection and the market mechanism would have replicated similar discourse
at national [eve[. Matters developed very differently. The Treaty focus was heavily on markets,
with the consequence that there was a decoup[ing of economic integration and social protection.
This led to constitutional asymmetry. Whereas at national [eve[ economic and social policy
had the same constitutional status, it was economic policy that predominated at the EU [eve[.
The very predominance afforded to economic policy reduced the Member States' ability to
influence their own economies or to 'realize self-defined socio-po[itica[ goals'[ 4 ].
The doctrines of direct effect and supremacy heightened these constraints. Scharpf argues
that the Member States failed to recognize the impact of these twin doctrines, which [aid the
foundations for integration through law, whereby the Community courts could advance Treaty
objectives if integration through legislation was not possible because of disagreement in the
Council ["]. Negative integration through judicial decisions that deemed national laws to be
inconsistent with theTreaty, became the dominant mode of integration, until the new mode of
harmonization was introduced post the Single European Act 1986, thereby facilitating positive
integration.
There came to be increasing pressure for the EU to play a greater role in social policy, thereby
alleviating the constitutional imbalance between the market-making and market-correcting
functions of a polity. This goes much of the way to explain the inclusion of more heads of
competence dealing with social policy, as we[[ as development of the Structural Funds.
[33lFScharpf,
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There were, moreover, persistent efforts in the latter part of the previous millennium to recast
the single market in more ho[istic terms, so as to include aspects of social and labour policy["].

Scharpf argued that it was not, however, possible at the turn of the millennium for the EU to
adopt the stance towards social policy that it had declined to take when the Rome Treaty was
signed. It was not possible to treat social welfare and protection through uniform rules applicable
to all, because of the very diversity in welfare systems that existed within the Member States [3 7].
This was the rationale in part for the development of social policy through the Open Method of
Coordination[8].
Political parties and unions promoting 'social Europe' are thus confronted by a dilemma:
to ensure effectiveness, they need to assert the constitutional equality of social protection and
economic integration functions at the European [eve[- which could be achieved either through
European social programmes or through the harmonization of national socia[-protection systems.
At the same time, however, the present diversity of national social-protection systems and the
political salience of these differences make it practically impossible for them to agree on common
European solutions. Faced by this dilemma, the Union opted for a new governing mode, the open
method of coordination (OMC), in order to protect and promote social Europe.
These arguments are important. The following points are, however, pertinent in this context.
First, insofar as there is an imbalance between the economic and the social within the EU, this is
the result of Member State choice, just as isthe current institutional structure. It is of course true
that judicial doctrines of direct effect and supremacy, as developed by the c] EU, have heightened
this tension, but the fact remains that the centrality accorded to the four freedoms, and the
relative weakness of the social as compared to the economic dimension, is reflective of what the
Member States have been willing to accept, and the powers that it has been willing to accord, to
a supranational polity. There is a paradox lurking here. The desire to preserve national sovereignty
underpinned Member State reluctance to accord the EU power over social policy; yet the resulting
predominance of the economic over the social within the EU impacted on Member State freedom
to choose the balance between the economic and the social within the nation state.
Secondly, there is no doubt that legal doctrines of direct effect and supremacy sharpened the
cutting edge of the four freedoms, thereby further enhancing the economic dimension of the
Treaties, and the attendant negative integration resulting from the judicial doctrine. Scharpf's
argument, to the effect that the Member States were not cognizant of the significance of the
legal doctrine, should, nonetheless, be viewed with caution. Member States benefited from
such judicial doctrine, insofar as it invested the Treaties, and rules made thereunder, with a
peremptory force that they would otherwise have lacked. To put the same point in another
way, these doctrines, as enforced by the EU courts, gave greater credibility to the commitments
embodied in the Treaties.

I36l
P Craig,

'The Evolution of the Single Market', in C Barnard and J Scott (eds), The Law ofthe Single European Market,

Unpacking the Premises (Hart, 2002) Chap 1; P Craig, 'The Community Political Order' (2003) 10 Indiana Journal of
Global Legal Studies 79.
[371Scharpf, 'The European Social Model (n 33) 649-51.

I3l Ibid 652.

38 1REVISTA ROMANA DE DREPT EUROPEAN NR. 4/20181

DOCTRINA

The EU, Democracy and InstitutionaL Structure: Past, Present and Future

(ii) The Economic, the Social and the Political: EMU and the Financial Crisis
The financial crisis impacted significantly on the balance between the economic and the
social, and more broadly on the political structure of decision-making in the EU. The effects
were manifest at the EU [eve[, insofar as the financial crisis meant that the EU's energies were
concentrated on resolving the economic problems, with scant energy [eft for broader social
policy. They were also manifest at Member State [eve[, since relief for debtor states was subject to
conditionality requirements, which imposed strict austerity limits, with attendant implications for
national social and welfare policy. Concerns in this respect were voiced by many commentators.
For Scharpf, the imbalance between the economic and the social was heightened by the financial
crisis, and the responses thereto[ 9 ]. This was, in part, because the euro regime, as it presently
functions, exerts 'downward pressures on public sector functions and on wages - in the upswing
to dampen the rise of external deficits and in the downswing to stimulate export-led recovery[40];
it was in part also because of what Scharpf regards as the far-reaching discretion afforded to
the Commission under the EU legislation enacted to strengthen EU oversight of national fiscal
policy after the crisis [4 1] .
Wi[kinson, drawing on the motif of authoritarian [ibera[ism, voiced the concern that 'democratic
processes have been side-[ined, a[beit [arge[y with the comp[icity of nationa[ po[itica[ and
economic e[ites, not to assert strong statehood but for the purpose of maintaining a project of
economic integration said to depend on the success of the sing[e currency'[4]. In simi[ar vein he
deprecates the fact that 'democratic authority is rep[aced by a combination of executive power
and market rationa[ity, defended by the perceived necessity of acting swift[y and bypassing
pub[ic debate[ 43 ].
In simi[ar vein, Dawson and de Witte express disquiet at the way in which the financia[ crisis de
facto shifted the substantive boundaries as to the intrusion of the EU into Member States, 'by
increasingly making in-roads in Member State autonomy in redistributive, fisca[ and budgetary
matters [441 , as manifest in the conditiona[ity criteria imposed on debtor states. They too voice
worry about the increased executive dominance in decision-making, with agenda setting being
done to an ever greater extent by the European Council. They acknow[edge that the rationa[e
for executive contro[ in proposa[s for reform of EMU is that 'on[y executives and governments
carry the competence, speed, credibi[ity and [egitimacy to mandate and direct significant EU
intervention in core state powers such as fisca[ po[icy'[4 ]. They, nonethe[ess, deprecate reform
initiatives that further enhance executive power. Reform shou[d, they argue, be such that the
substantive direction of EU po[icy can be tru[y de[iberated and contested[ 4 ], thereby meeting a
391FScharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? (Oxford University Press, 1999); Scharpf (n 21).
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basic precept of po[itica[ self-determination, that 'government is conducted not justfor but by
the people'[47].
There is force inthe preceding arguments. Thus, it is assuredly correct that the Commission has
discretion pursuant to various regulations enacted post the financial crisis. The salient regulations
were, however, approved through the ordinary legislative procedure, with significant input from
the EP as we[[ as the Council, although the room for parliamentary involvement thereafter is
limited[48 ]. It is,moreover, important not to be asymmetrical inthis respect. It is the executives of
the Member States that are very much inthe driving seat when it comes to setting their national
budget. They commonly exercise considerable discretion in this regard, such that it isdifficult to
ensure parliamentary accountability. There may be reasons why the national executive iswilling
to tolerate significant budgetary imbalance, or feels powerless to address the issue. This can in
turn have serious consequences for other Member States, through the strain thereby placed
on the euro. The existence of Commission discretion should, therefore, be viewed in this light.
The post-financial crisis legislative schema is,moreover, premised on such Commission discretion,
coupled with increased provision for national budgetary targets that can be policed by national
legislatures more readily than hitherto.

5. Institutional Structure and Democracy: The Paradox
There is a paradox of cause and effect inthe EU's inter-institutional configuration of power as it
presently exists, and as it likely to remain in the future. The cause captures the facts as set out
hitherto. The Member States have shaped the present configuration of EU inter-institutional
power, which is beset by a democratic deficit insofar as there is scant connection between
electoral vote and political power or responsibility, such that it isdifficult for the voters to express
aview as to the direction of EU policy that will be translated into action. Member States bear the
principal responsibility for the status quo, since they devised the current schema.
The effect captures the way in which we think about democratic legitimation in the EU.
The infirmities in EU decision-making constitute the driver for the argument that EU legitimacy
and democracy must be grounded in the Member States, not merely as one mode of
representation within the EU. The argument becomes more 'viscera[ and foundational', in the
sense that it is the Member States, and the national parliaments therein, that are regarded as
the true bedrock of democracy. Their claims in this regard are grounded in the EU's democratic
deficiencies, and this in turn is used to fuel the argument that such parliaments should participate
in EU decision-making.
The paradox resides in the conjunction of cause and effect: Member State choice is central to
the institutional architecture at EU [eve[ and the democratic infirmity that is reflected therein.
The infirmity cannot, by definition, be resolved at EU [eve[, given the nature of the choice thus made,
with the consequence that the solution must be found elsewhere. The paradox is exacerbated by
reason of the fact that, as argued above, most national parliaments would be in accord with their
national executives in resisting change that would alleviate the democratic deficit within the EU,
47l Ibid 382. Italics in the original.
48]C Fasone, 'European Economic Governance and Parliamentary Representation: What Place forthe European Parliament?'
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because of the effect that this could have on their own power. Thus, while 'a true political Union
would involve not suppressing, but channelling and promoting meaningful conflict over the EU's
substantive goals'[49 ], and while reinvigoration in this respect may be especially pertinent post
the financial crisis, there is scant likelihood of this occurring.
It should be made clear that nothing in the preceding argument presumes the idea of a single
demos for the entire EU; it is not predicated on the denial of plurality in the political choices
made by the EU; it does not rest on assumptions of a particular kind of federal order or anything
akin thereto; it presumes no particular distribution of power between the EU and the Member
States; and it is perfectly consistent with a role for national parliaments.
The paradox is,by way of contrast, simply reflective of the politics concerning the disposition of
inter-institutional power as it has unfolded since the inception of the EEC. It is reflective also of
normative assumptions as to the type of Community or Union that the Member States are willing
to create, and the powers that they are content to invest in it. The enduring paradox persists:
Member State refusal to allow institutional change that would alleviate the democratic deficiency
in EU decision-making remains a principal cause of the malaise, the consequential effect being
that the problem can only be addressed at state [eve[.
The paradox is a[[ the more important because it comes with a 'political bite', which is doubly
undermining for the EU. Member States prefer to off-load blame concerning deficiencies in EU
decision-making to the EU institutions themselves, and divest themselves of responsibility. They
do not readily concede their role as institutional architects of the status quo. It is, moreover,
these very institutional deficiencies that serve to rob the EU of the legitimacy that it requires
to tackle difficult social or economic issues. The EU is caught between a rock and a hard place,
berated in equal measure for its over-attachment to the economic at the expense of the social,
while castigated for lacking the democratic legitimacy to make dispositive social or redistributive
decisions.
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